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Notes Toward a Theory of the Executive
Class
DAVID A. WESTBROOKt
The astounding levels of wealth regularly transferred to
the top executives of American corporations, ostensibly as
compensation for their services as managers, have raised
controversy, or at the very least, eyebrows at the New York
Times and other bastions of national propriety. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated
rules requiring more disclosure of executive compensation,
following on various efforts taken under the aegis of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Congressional response to
shenanigans at Enron and elsewhere. So far, however,
neither upper middlebrow disapproval nor mandatory
disclosure has done anything discernible to diminish the
pay packages of top U.S. executives.
The controversies surrounding executive compensation
are rather funny in a mordant way that recalls the great
social economist Thorstein Veblen, who lanced the
pretensions of the gilded age in The Theory of the Leisure
Class.' Veblen should be important to us today, however,
not just as a mirror for contemporary vulgarities, but
because he provides a very American corrective to that
national intellectual weakness, excessive individualism.
Specifically, executive compensation tends to be understood,
criticized, and defended as compensation, the quid pro quo
of an employment contract between a company and its
executive. No doubt this relentless individualism has many
sources-the microeconomic focus of business culture, the
methodological individualism of academic economics,
t Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York,
and author of the forthcoming Between the Citizen and the State: An
Introduction to the Law of Corporations in the United States (Paradigm 2007). A
version of this paper was given as a talk at the World Association of
International Studies Conference on Critical World Problems, Stanford
University, July 31, 2007.
1. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899).
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Horatio Alger stories, the national tendency to view politics
moralistically, and balance sheets all spring to mind-but
understanding executive compensation in such individualistic
terms has produced a rather inchoate "debate," and has
obscured other, perhaps more important, truths.
I maintain that the recent rise in CEO compensation
should be understood in more social, as opposed to
individualistic, terms. Much which is obscure or undecidable
within contemporary debate on the issue makes perfect
sense if we shift our focus from contract to property, from
the quantity of payment to the social position that affords
payment, and from rational self-interest (in this context
called "incentives") to status. We are witnessing an
important development within our society, the effort to
construct what, in a bow to Veblen, we should call an
executive class, rather than a few cases of mere individual
greed.
That American executives are being paid huge amounts
is not in serious question. My favorite anecdote to this effect
is about Richard Parsons, CEO of Time Warner, biannually
taking the company jet to visit his twenty acre vineyard,
which I would guess is almost twice the size of his dining
room, but romantically located in Tuscany. You know,
sometimes a man has to tend his vines, as the Bible says.
The layered decadence in this story, especially the palpable
desire for authenticity-land farmed for centuries, perhaps
millennia, but of course, not by me-is kind of delicious.
And the wine is also said to be very good.
Turning from anecdote to more general comparisons,
CEO compensation has grown by virtually all metrics in
recent years. This sort of statistic is hackneyed but still
impressive: the average pay for a CEO of a large company
was up 27% in 2005,2 nicely outpacing the inflation rate of
3.3%. By comparison, Labor Department statistics suggest
worker's pay was up 2.9% in 2005, a fall in inflation-
adjusted terms.3 In probably the most cited metric, today's
CEOs make more, relative to their employees, than their
2. Eric Dash, Executive Pay: A Special Report: Off to the Races Again,
Leaving Many Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at A5 (citing study by Pearl
Meyer & Partners, the compensation practice of Clark Consulting).
3. Id.
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counterparts of a generation or two ago. Average top
executive salaries are, according to another study, 170
times the pay of the median (not least-well-paid) employee. 4
In 1940, the multiple was 68. 5 And if one compares the
compensation of CEOs in America to that of their
counterparts in comparable companies in other industrial
countries, the Americans are paid much more, though there
is some indication that, in an age of multinational markets
for executives, the Europeans want to be paid like
Americans.6
Some of my fellow aficionados of capitalism may need to
be reminded that more than simple envy is at issue in this
controversy. Compared with other nations, Americans
traditionally have a high tolerance, even enthusiasm, for
the wealth of others. But even corporation law scholars,
institutional investors, and others who are quite comfortable
around money and its inequalities are somewhat taken
aback by today's executive compensation practices. Whether
or not executive compensation is high vis-A-vis some moral
standard, it is objectively high vis-A-vis traditional business
practice in the same companies. Never before, not even in
the golden age of organization man, have managers-as
opposed to entrepreneurs, financiers, or conquistadors-
been paid so much for their role in the ordinary business of
an operating company.
Reporting on such developments, journalists for the
New York Times and other disapproving parties tend to
adopt a classic populist stance of being shocked, simply
shocked, at the impropriety of it all. This stance, which is
sometimes genuine, rests on a fundamental misapprehension
of what "executive compensation" is and how it works. More
interestingly, however, even those who criticize "executive
compensation" on corporate governance grounds tend to see
the practice with a sophisticated myopia. As suggested, the
essence of these misapprehensions is to understand
executive compensation on its own terms, i.e., as an
individual company's purchase of management services
4. Id. (citing study by Carola Frydman and Raven Saks).
5. Id.
6. See Geraldine Fabrikant, U.S.-Style Pay Packages Are All the Rage in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at Al.
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from an individual executive, who must be compensated for
the time and effort needed to provide such service.
Presumably those most obviously responsible for current
levels of executive compensation, the managers who benefit
and the corporate boards who approve, are content with
such misapprehensions-for who doesn't expect to get paid,
and as well as the market will bear, for a job well done?
To begin simply, there are many ways for a company to
pay its management. Top executives are typically paid a
lavish but otherwise ordinary salary, and enjoy a host of
perquisites-interest free loans and those company jets to
Tuscany and the like-as well as substantial benefits in the
event of a number of contingencies, e.g., they are sued, or
retire, or the company is acquired, or things simply do not
work out. The huge numbers bandied about in discussions
of executive compensation, however, are driven by so-
called "performance based compensation." The idea of"performance based compensation" is probably familiar in
roughly the following form: if a company pays its executives
with stock, or stock options, then managers will have direct
incentives to make the company a success, because the
company's success will be reflected in its stock price, which
means that the managers will be paid more. Although
successful managers stand to receive a massive paycheck,
shareholders will not care, because their shares, too, have
increased in value.
The argument for performance based compensation has
been incredibly persuasive. As IBM has taken to saying, in
growth, "all pots are watered." And Silicon Valley, for all its
excesses, still a source of national pride, was largely built
on options. Even after Enron and other scandals, almost
nobody in corporate governance circles argues that an
executive's compensation should not somehow be linked
to the company's performance. This enthusiasm for
performance based compensation has been written into law:
the corporate tax code was amended in 1993 to ensure that
all executive compensation above $1 million be linked to
performance. 7 At least in part as a result of this change in
tax law, compensation schemes that are essentially massive
grants of property have been generally adopted.
7. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000).
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From time to time, property transferred under such
schemes must, according to the tax laws, be priced and the
increases in individual wealth reported as income (e.g.,
upon the exercise of options). Herein lies the
misapprehension: that number is reported, and then
criticized or defended, as if it were an hourly wage, a
payment for services rendered. It is, of course. But then
again, medieval kings granted titles of nobility and
appurtenant lands in return for doughtiness in battle or
other service to the crown-the political significance of such
transfers was hardly the quid pro quo, and the wealth
subsequently derived from holding such property hardly
reflected the ongoing performance, as an aristocrat, of the
talented nobleman who received the fiefdom.
Operating under the misapprehension that executives
are being paid for their labor, journalists and other populist
critics often use the pay of the least or median well-paid
employee as a sort of yardstick to argue that today's
executives are being paid "too much." If a secretary makes
x, then it might be okay for the CEO to make 10x, or even
50x, but not 100 or 170 times what the secretary makes.
170 times is too high. Certainly it cannot be right that
anybody is paid $144,573 a day, year in and year out, as
Exxon CEO Lee Raymond was paid.8 Superman couldn't
work that hard.
Built into this argument is a labor theory of value:
people get paid (or should get paid) for how hard they work.
I think this is wrong in general, but it is certainly wrong in
this context. A CEO is paid almost entirely with property,
stock, and stock options, along with the perquisites of office.
The Queen of the Netherlands is not paid well because she
works hard. She is paid well because she is the Queen, and
she owns things, notably a sizeable portion of Royal Dutch
Shell. Roughly the same could be said of Mr. Raymond. This
does not mean CEOs do not work. Presumably, they must
work very hard-to become CEOs. But their effective pay is
a function of their political fortunes in the company, and of
the company's fortunes in the stock market, not of effort
8. See Jad Mouawad, For Leading Exxon to Its Riches, $144,573 a Day, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at Al. Mouawad discusses the compensation of outgoing
Exxon CEO Lee R. Raymond. Mr. Raymond's "pension" was a 98.4 million
dollar single payment-there is nothing "pensionesque" about it. Id.
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expended or even job done.
One need not go back to the Middle Ages to
conceptualize pay in terms of position, that is, as a
consequence of status, rather than as compensation. In the
words of the Supreme Court in the famous Howey case, we
ordinarily expect securities investors to profit "solely from
the efforts of others."9 An investor's wealth has to do with
what is owned, not what is done. I certainly am not doing
much to generate whatever wealth is in my retirement
portfolio ("Bearing risk" is not unlike "breathing"). And if I
died tomorrow, leaving everything to my three year old, he
certainly would not have earned his wealth, he would have
inherited his position. In paying CEOs with stock and stock
options, however, we make them investors first, and
salarymen second. As investors, the wealth that CEOs
receive is a function of the success of the company (which
necessarily represents the efforts of many, many other
people, as measured in the financial markets, which
represents the assessments of very many people indeed).
Thus, even when operating as intended, the phrase
"executive compensation" is deeply misleading. CEOs are
only tangentially paid in exchange for the sweat of their
brow. Executives compete for powerful positions from which
wealth flows.
In those circles of the academic and business worlds
that concern themselves with corporate governance issues,
executive compensation also tends to be understood as
much like paying the secretary, only with more zeros. To
ask the question practically, from the perspective of the
board of directors, the question is how does a company pay
an executive to do a good job? To the uninitiated, this might
seem to require figuring out what would constitute a good
performance on the job. Obviously, however, in a context as
amorphous as being a top manager of a complicated
business in an even more complicated environment,
assessing performance would be very difficult, much as
assessing the individual performance of a political leader is
a difficult task, even for historians with the benefit of
hindsight.
Corporate governance theory, however, provides a
9. SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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ready-made understanding of the problem of how to
understand executive performance, and unsurprisingly,
leads to ready-made answers. Since Berle and Means wrote
their classic The Modern Corporation and Private
Property,1° the problem of corporate governance has been
understood to be the separation of ownership of the
company from control over the company. Shareholders own
the company; management controls the company. Since
they have control, management is likely to use their power
to benefit themselves, in one way or another, to pay
themselves too much, which makes the company less
valuable, and therefore hurts shareholders. In this
understanding, a CEO does a good job if he serves the
(financial) interests of the company's shareholders, rather
than benefiting himself. Thus, in corporate governance
circles, both the problem of executive compensation and its
solution are understood structurally, in terms of the
relationship between the company's executive and its
owners, rather than in terms of an objective idea of"performance" for which the executive is paid.
Performance based compensation directly addresses
such a persuasive idea because it directly addressed this
structural understanding of the problem of executive
compensation. If the problem identified by Berle and Means
was that executives would pay themselves too much,
thereby impoverishing the company and its shareholders,
then the answer was to pay executives with equity and
options to buy equity. Executives would only make money if
they improved the fortunes of the company, and in that case
all shareholders would be happy. Performance based
compensation dissolved the conflict of interest that Berle
and Means identified between the shareholders and
executives by making executives into major shareholders.
In 1990, Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy provided
explicit academic statements of this position." It was a
brilliant solution, particularly for people with traditional
10. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
11. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not
How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138;
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
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understandings of corporate governance, i.e., everybody
that mattered.
Since the 1990s, at least two things have happened to
make performance based compensation seem like a less
than perfect solution to the problem of executive
compensation, which we can summarize in two words:
Enron and Disney. First, Enron: if executives are paid with
stock, they might work really hard to make the share price
look good, if necessary messing with the company's
accounting. 12 Second, Disney: boards of directors have been
voting stratospheric pay packages for people who do not
perform, like short-term Disney President Michael Ovitz.
Evidently, the problem raised by Berle and Means is not
laid to rest by granting some options, and critics within
corporate governance circles are again arguing that
shareholders are being taken advantage of by managers,
that executive compensation is "too high.''13
Contemporary critics of executive compensation tend to
persist, however, in viewing the matter in the conceptual
frame established by Berle and Means, and indeed, largely
through the lens provided by Jensen and Murphy, as
basically a matter of getting an employment contract right.
This perspective limits the discourse in a number of ways.
If we view the matter in quantitative terms, it is not at
all clear that excessive executive compensation imposes
substantial costs on shareholders, or on society as a whole.
The amounts of money involved are sometimes difficult to
comprehend. In the recent Disney decision, the Supreme
Court of Delaware noted that while short-term Disney
president Michael Ovitz was paid approximately $130
million in severance, which sounds like a lot of money to do
a bad job, Disney had $19 billion in revenues, and over $3
billion in operating revenues, for the year. 14 Nor is it clear
what the social impact of such a payout might be:
presumably some of Ovitz's gains were available to the
12. See David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of
a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61 (2003).
13. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)
(stating this currently influential position).
14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 54 n.72 (Del. 2006).
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capital markets through reinvestment, and some to the
market for lawn care, but there is no reason to think that
much of the money disappeared down a rabbit hole.
A second, more subtle, reason not to worry too much
about shareholders whose companies are overpaying for
managerial services, at least in the short to medium term,
is that most executive compensation is not cash (that would
impose tax burdens on both the company and the
individual). By using stock and options, so long as stock
prices remain high, the company can essentially print
money for compensating executives. Unsettling, perhaps,
but, at least in a long bull market in which lots of liquidity
is looking for a place to invest, quite manageable. So long as
executives are willing to take, in effect, company script in
lieu of cash, why should we care? More generally, if
corporations are paying too much for executive
compensation, such overpayment should be reflected in the
company's stock price, and should, like almost all else that
ails corporations, be self-correcting in a reasonably efficient
capital market.
There is more to say, of course, but long story short,
corporate governance critics who insist both (i) that executive
compensation is too high; and (ii) on understanding executive
compensation in terms of a bargained-for pay agreement
between a company and its manager, leave themselves open
to endless debate culminating in a Scottish verdict of "not
proven"-within corporate governance discourse, the faith
in contract and markets generally is very strong, and any
argument that something might be amiss has an uphill
battle.
Normatively, critics of executive compensation tend to
focus on making executive pay actually reflect performance.
In this view, performance based compensation is a fine idea,
but just has not been tried yet, as was long said of Marxism.
The reform of performance based compensation rests on two
dubious propositions. First, reformers maintain that the
problem with current practice is that executives get paid
regardless of performance. If the company's stock price goes
up, executives are paid for doing a good job; if the
company's stock price is stable, executives are paid for
strategic positioning; if the company's stock price goes
down, executives are paid for coping with difficult
circumstances. As it now stands, executive "performance" is
1055
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so amorphous a concept that it does not mean anything.
Thus the reform of executive compensation requires a
better definition of executive performance.
While it is difficult to imagine making matters much
worse, a degree of skepticism may be in order. Reformers
look to define executive performance objectively and with
some degree of precision; clearly "being executive while the
stock market price rises" is not enough. Well and good, but
taken seriously, the idea of defining "executive performance"
objectively is tantamount to saying that the selection and
compensation processes for executives can be depoliticized,
and accepted as such (I suggest SAT scores).
The second dubious presumption of corporate governance
reformers is the psychology entailed in performance based
compensation, which is indeed the individualistic psychology
of liberal economics more generally, viz., rational self-
interest. Executive compensation is about setting incentives;
people work harder if they are paid more. While again there
is obviously some truth here, it is difficult to believe that
this truth is very important. Do executives even know
exactly what they do when they work? Does anyone believe
(on what basis?) that executives can correlate their own
performance to their pay? If we paid everybody in the
United States twice as much for one day, would national
productivity double? An executive's performance is not a
bushel of wheat, which he can sell more or less of,
bargaining against the board. And if the executive is not
sure precisely what he is selling, we may be certain that the
board of directors has only a foggy notion of what it is
buying. Thus, the idea of incentives-a rigorous correlation
between pay and performance-is structurally neat, but
practically useless.
Less practically, but even more interestingly,
understanding executive compensation in terms of
employment contracts obscures perhaps the most obvious
question raised in this controversy: pretty much everybody
believes executive compensation is "too high," at least
almost nobody defends it, but it continues to go up. Why? To
pose the puzzle from the perspective of accounting and
corporate governance: executive compensation, like salaries
generally, is clearly a cost to companies, and therefore it is
in the interest of corporations and their shareholders to
keep the cost of executive compensation, like other costs,
[Vol. 551056
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down. Boards of directors, who set compensation for the
CEO and other officers, are supposed to protect the
interests of corporations and their shareholders. So if these
rates of executive compensation are, by widespread
consensus, excessive, and not in the interest of shareholders,
why are boards still approving them?
The usual, rather lame, answer is collusion-
management has too much influence over the board of
directors. But after Enron, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which, among other things, requires boards to
establish compensation committees comprised of outside
directors, and to do a better job disclosing CEO
compensation to the shareholders. 15 And, as mentioned, the
SEC recently has required more disclosure of executive
compensation. More deeply, management greed is not new.
Nor is the possibility that directors are too cozy with
management. This is, as also mentioned above, the
fundamental problem of corporation law, and has been for
generations. So why do we see an explosion of CEO salaries
now?
A hint is provided by a third objection to the current
explosion in CEO salaries which is somewhat less common
and which, notably, is not individualistic. Some critics
maintain that even in a hierarchical setting like a company
(or more broadly, a market society) only a certain degree of
inequality can be politically tolerated. At least in the
abstract, such criticism is inescapably vague. It is unclear
why employees who tolerate a 10 to 1 ratio between CEO
pay and their salaries would balk at a ratio of 50 to 1, or
100 to 1, or 170 to 1-at some point, one crosses a line, but
where? It is even more unclear why directors would think it
proper to transfer substantial ownership of companies to
management in lieu of paying them with cash-and how
substantial an ownership interest? Answers to such
judgment calls turn on the significance of positions, and
hence the assessment of inequality, in a given cultural
setting. That setting-bluntly, the meaning of inequality-
is currently changing in the United States.
Thinking more socially (and more seriously) about why
15. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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levels of executive compensation have grown so explosively
in recent years would require a more nuanced analysis of
the contemporary economy, and particularly, the market for
CEOs and other top executives. Leaving questions of social
causality to one side, we should at least be aware of the
range of political decisions that have accompanied the rise
in executive compensation, and that have shaped this
economy more generally. While there is no space in this
Essay for detailed historical analysis of how we reached our
present positions, we might sketch a few directions such
analysis might take.
First, while bonuses are as old as the hills, only in 1993
was the tax code amended to ensure that all executive
compensation above $1 million be linked to performance.
That is, as economic and social history goes, a fairly recent
development. Widespread adoption of payment schemes
that were essentially grants of property had the effect of
giving managers of established businesses the financial
upside of entrepreneurs who found businesses. As law
professor Charles Elson put it, "Exxon was there long before
Mr. Raymond was there and will be there long after he
leaves. Yet he received Rockefeller returns without taking
the Rockefeller risk."16
Second, once executive compensation grew into a
complicated business involving stock options, severance
practices, complex perquisites (which needed to be
disclosed, or not, in various ways) and the like, it was clear
that what the world needed was another consultant,
namely a compensation consultant. An entire industry
sprang up to help corporate boards figure out how to put
together compensation packages that would be attractive to
prospective CEOs and at least publicly perceived as
affordable to the company.
Third, the SEC sensibly enough has wanted the details
of executive compensation to be made publicly available,
because how someone is paid presumably affects how they
16. Mouawad, supra note 8. Rephrased, to argue with Michael Eisner's 1997
payout of $577 million from Walt Disney is different from arguing with Steven
Jobs $775 million from Apple, which he founded. If, of course, you think what
Jobs was doing was creating/owning, and what Eisner was doing was "working."
But my whole point is it is ridiculous to think of Eisner's case that "work" is
what is significant here.
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work, and it also affects the cost structure of the company,
which is the sort of thing that prudent investors would like
to know.
Note what these developments come to: individual
executive (particularly CEO) pay arrangements are now
complex, and fairly public-at least among the CEOs and
corporate boards and investment analysts that care about
such things. And there is reason to believe that interest in
these matters is broader; we all know the names of many
top executives, who are the subject of incessant stories in
the Times, the Wall Street Journal, and elsewhere in the
middlebrow press. In short, CEO pay went from being
private business, to public business, to being celebrated.
In a parallel but relevant development, the idea of what
an executive does has shifted over the last two generations.
What had once been "run the business" became more like
''run a business." Rather than rise through the ranks,
midlevel executives increasingly swap companies, even
whole markets, in which they work. The management
function became separated from the business context. This
is not entirely new, of course. Harvard and other business
schools have been preaching this for a long time, and it has
started to sink in. If schools can teach management in
general, then management can be commoditized, can
become a marketable skill. We can speak of a market for
executives, or in the law school jargon, a market for
corporate control. The old saying at Pepsi was when you
start at the company, a gun is fired-and you run until the
bullet catches you. That was then. An executive today is
likely to step sideways, make a lateral move to another
company. Pepsi's new CEO, Indra Nooyi, held strategic
planning positions at Asea Brown Boveri (now ABB),
Motorola, and the Boston Consulting Group before joining
Pepsi's management.
To add another relatively recent wrinkle: in the 1980s,
and in a different form, the 1990s, the U.S. economy
underwent a wave of takeovers, which resulted in the
wholesale firing of a lot of people, including a lot of
managers. Even when no takeover is imminent, the threat
of a takeover can spur boards of directors to seek new
management. As a result, the tenure of executives has come
down, and CEOs seem to view their jobs as somewhat
unreliable. Therefore, in order to leave a good position,
1059
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executives demand substantial pay upfront, and in case
things do not work out for one reason or another, they
demand "downside protection." None of this, of course, has
much to do with how the company is performing.
Putting these things together, CEOs have come to view
their earning potential much like professional athletes do.
Like athletes, CEOs justifiably believe that they can make
enormous amounts of money so long as they are perceived
to be on top of their games, but they must cash in quickly
because life, and particularly the life of perceptions, is
uncertain. There are of course differences. How an athlete
is performing at a given moment is almost always easier to
assess objectively than how an executive is performing.
Even in the case of athletes, however, scouting is a
substantial industry, and perception matters. In the world
of sponsorship-where the real money is made-perception
is all, and wealth is a function of celebrity, however
deserved.
Understanding CEOs to be like professional athletes
goes a long way toward explaining the otherwise perverse
behavior of corporate boards in voting for stratospheric
executive compensation, thereby raising the company's
costs. If we understand that CEOs are acquired in what
amounts to a public auction market, then executive
compensation becomes a prestige item, nicely expressed in
sports by the phrase "marquee" player. In getting a flashy
CEO, and paying him accordingly, boards are not so subtly
complimenting themselves and their company, and
bragging to the world. We might call this the Steinbrenner
effect. Rephrased, part of what one is buying, when buying
the services of Derek Jeter, or a Ferrari, is the ability to say
(not to have to say) that I paid a lot of money for this
player, or this car. The "cost" in practice is an "asset." And
here we are very close indeed to Veblen: economic
rationality or irrationality is not the point-the point is
status.
Understanding CEOs as professional athletes explains
something else otherwise odd, but also familiar from sports:
a considerable gap is emerging between CEO pay and the
pay of the next rung of management. Pay of treasurers, for
example, while no doubt generous, has not exhibited the
stratospheric rise of CEO pay. Why? Similarly, in sports,
the rise in salaries of journeyman professional athletes has
1060 [Vol. 5 5
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not paced the rise in "compensation" paid to stars. The
treasurer, like the journeyman athlete, is not a marquee
player.
If CEOs are sports stars, compensation consultants are
brokers and social arbiters. The work of compensation
consultants is not suggesting how to structure pay packages
(accountants and lawyers could do that), but instead
reporting on "what is competitive," that is, what did the
other guy get? The question asked by both CEOs and
boards is "what is prestigious," not "what would it be
reasonable to pay to get somebody competent in the
executive suite?" In short, the recent rise in CEO pay is due
to competition for prestige within the class of folks that
controls companies. Unsurprisingly, the dynamics have all
the sobriety of real estate in Newport during the gilded era,
or these days, Martha's Vineyard or Telluride.
Let me close with three remarks. First, by using equity
-property-in enterprises as the basis of compensation,
executive compensation has gone far toward creating a
class in the old sense of folks with a specific relationship to
the means of production guaranteed by a regime of property
rights. Second, and in some tension with the first, there are
reasons to doubt that executives will ever constitute a class
in the traditional sense of a hereditable social position.
While one might date the emergence of "contemporary"
executive compensation practices in various ways, by all
accounts the regime has not been around for very long. It
remains to be seen how successful the current cohort of top
executives will be at transmitting their positions to their
children. But tax politics, specifically hostility to corporate
and inheritance taxes, and the increasing irrelevance of the
income tax on wages, suggests that this administration is
interested in trying to make current disparities hereditable.
What these two remarks might mean for our children's
understanding of the United States I leave for another day.
Third, turning back to corporate governance, I do not
mean to suggest that executive compensation is absolutely
irrelevant to the running of companies. But I do think it fair
to say that executive compensation has very little to do with
general corporate health, productivity, shareholder equity, or
anything else internal to the company, and I am skeptical
that efforts to get performance based compensation "right"
will be more than window dressing, though perhaps
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nonetheless worth doing. The problem for corporate
governance is not so much the cost of compensation. The
problem here is that regardless of the way executive
performance is measured, achieving compensation that a man
can be proud of requires justification, even while other aspects
of the enterprise are neglected. Executive compensation
distorts the perspective of management, a once familiar
phenomenon that used to be called class bias, which is
probably not a good thing for our economy, or our society.
